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ABSTRACT The fifth generation (5G) mobile telecommunication network is expected to support Multi-
Access Edge Computing (MEC), which intends to distribute computation tasks and services from the
central cloud to the edge clouds. Towards ultra-responsive, ultra-reliable and ultra-low-latency MEC
services, the current mobile network security architecture should enable a more decentralized approach
for authentication and authorization processes. This paper proposes a novel decentralized authentication
architecture that supports flexible and low-cost local authentication with the awareness of context
information of network elements such as user equipment and virtual network functions. Based on a
Markov model for backhaul link quality, as well as a random walk mobility model with mixed mobility
classes and traffic scenarios, numerical simulations have demonstrated that the proposed approach is able
to achieve a flexible balance between the network operating cost and the MEC reliability.
INDEX TERMS 5G, network architecture, context awareness, Multi-Access Edge Computing, MEC,
network reliability
I. INTRODUCTION
F IFTH generation (5G) mobile telecommunication net-work has been expected to involve Multi-Access Edge
Computing (MEC) [1]–[3]. MEC has evolved from mobile
cloud computing, which shifts the important computation
and storage tasks from the core network to the access
network. Thus, mobile services can gain superiority of
low latency, power efficiency, context-awareness, and en-
hanced privacy protection [4], [5]. Furthermore, the security
concerns become across the core network and the access
network – from network elements to user equipment (UE)
and from tenants to their network slices [6]. For example, the
mobility management entity (MME) is set to be divided into
few functions which can be co-existed in the access network
and core network. This function decomposition gives the
overall system flexibility, deployment efficiency and service
agility.
The fourth generation (4G) long-term evolution (LTE)
authentication and key agreement (AKA) has an architec-
turally inherited dependency on the core network, and can
therefore constrain the exploitation of MEC. Nevertheless,
there has been limited contributions on the evolution of the
LTE centralized security architecture despite of demands of
improved AKA efficiency in MEC [7]. However, delivering
a flexible next generation telecommunication system is the
main objective of 5G. All services at the edge of the network
should be securely provided. Hence, the authentication and
authorization processes can also exist at the edge of the
network to increase the subscriber authentication efficiency
and the reliability to the overall system.
Generally, authentication, authorization and accounting
(AAA) processes require certain amount of cost from
the system per registration of a subscriber. Putting these
processes at the edge of the network would increase the
efficiency of subscriber authentication and authorization.
Also collecting valuable information helps to understand the
context of the overall network situations, the connectivity
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availability and the traffic pattern [8]. With such knowledge
we can increase the overall system reliability with minimal
operations cost. In this paper, we will use the context-
awareness technique to extract the network situation and
reduce the traffic in between fronthaul and backhaul when
subscriber authentication and authorization take place. Par-
ticularly, we use network context information to distinguish
the normal from emergency situation and deliver proactive
control in facing any situation.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel de-
centralized security approach for MEC in 5G networks,
which aims at delivering a flexible and context-aware AKA
executing within an edge cloud (EC), and decouples the
authentication process from the central cloud when backhaul
connection outages are detected. The propose approach is
to make aware of network context information and able
to proactively synchronize subscriber profiles to support
local AKA procedures. We develop an numerical simulation
demonstrates the balance in between the MEC reliability and
the operations cost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly
reviews the 4G LTE AKA mechanism, and analyzes its
inadequacy of 5G MEC services. In Section III, we propose
a novel decentralized authentication architecture in 5G.
A Virtualized AAA system across the central cloud and
edge cloud is elaborated in Section III-A. Section III-B
formulates a MEC cognitive security system that maintains
the availability of the services. Section IV-A presents a
context-aware mechanism that enables the local authen-
tication to reduce the backhaul traffic and improve the
efficiency of subscriber management. Section IV-B presents
a Markov chain to characterize and forecast the reliability of
backhaul connections. At the end, Section V demonstrates
the effectiveness of our proposed method with numerical
simulations, before we conclude this paper and provide a
couple of future challenges in Section VI. For the readers’
convenience, Tab. I lists all the abbreviations used in this
article in the alphabetical order.
II. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF CELLULAR
NETWORKS
A. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT IN THE
3GPP EPS
Security in the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
Evolved Packet System (EPS) is divided into access stratum
(AS) and non-access stratum (NAS) security. Security pro-
cedures rely on the EPS architecture; the most important
elements are shown in Fig. 1 and [9], [10].
When a user equipment (UE) attaches to a LTE network,
the AKA is executed between UE and Mobility Management
Entity (MME). Using the same so-called key of access
security management entities (KASME), keys for securing
the NAS signaling are derived. Using KASME, UE and
MME also derive a key KeNB, which is also passed to the
evolved Node B (eNB) that the UE is connecting to. KeNB
is used in the communication session as the basis of AS
Abbreviation Definition
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
4G fourth generation
5G fifth generation
AAA authentication, authorization and accounting
AKA authentication and key agreement
AMF access and mobility management function
AS access stratum
BSS business supporting system
CCCM Central Cloud Connection Monitoring
CSSO Central Security Service Outage
CSSR Central Security Service Risk
EC edge cloud
ES Emergency Service
EPS Evolved Packet System
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
IKE Internet key exchange
IoT-GW Internet-of-Things Gateway
IPsec Internet protocol security
LAA Local Access Assistant
LSS Local Subscriber Servers
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MEC Multi-Access Edge Computing
MME Mobility Management Entity
MNO mobile network operator
NAS non-access stratum
NFV MANO network function virtualization management and
orchestration
OSS operations support system
O&M orchestration and management
RAN radio access network
SA Security Auditing
SDM software-defined mobile network
SDMO SDM orchestrator
SDM-C SDM coordinator
SDM-X SDM controller
SDN software-defined network
SEG security gateway
SMS short message service
TZ Trust Zone
UDM unified data management
UE user equipment
VIM virtual infrastructure manager
VNF virtual network function
V-AAA Virtualized-AAA
ZM Zone Management
TABLE 1. List of acronyms
security, i.e. security on the radio link between the UE and
the eNB. Three further keys are derived from KeNB for
control plane integrity protection, control plane encryption,
and user plane encryption, respectively. A fourth key for user
plane integrity protection is derived from KeNB only when
required. These traffic protection keys are not used for an
infinite amount of data. The eNB periodically initiates intra-
cell handover to derive a new KeNB and new protection and
encryption keys.
LTE specifies three pairs of cryptographic algorithms,
each pair comprises a confidentiality protection algorithm
and an integrity protection algorithm. This redundancy pro-
vides fallback options in case a pair fails during the expected
system life-cycle. Also, the backhaul link is protected by
Internet key exchange (IKE) / Internet protocol security
(IPsec). Generally, the IPsec tunnels are terminated by a
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FIGURE 1. Security Architecture of 3GPP LTE / EPS [11]
dedicated security gateway (SEG), but they may also be
terminated at the MME or serving gateway, for the control
and user plane, respectively.
Since the eNB is considered as a physically exposed
entity, with a notable risk of being compromised by an
attacker with physical access, it has no access to the NAS
signaling. However, it has access to the user plane traffic
that is decrypted and re-encrypted at the eNB between radio
interface and backhaul link. Also, 3GPP requires all network
elements installed in a “secure environment”, unauthorized
access to eNBs is strictly prohibited. The eNB is also
required to protect the keys and other important processes.
For an overall security concept for an LTE network,
additional non-standardized network security measures must
be implemented, among them traffic filtering and separation
between network-internal security zones, secure operation
and maintenance (O&M), and secure operation of services
such like DNS, NTP, IP routing, etc.
B. CHALLENGES IN 5G MULTI-ACCESS EDGE
COMPUTING
The 3GPP security architecture specified for LTE/EPS can-
not fulfill new requirements of emerging services in 5G.
5G networks requires to improve the flexibility of security
functions with the MEC services.
The concept of MEC was proposed by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), suggesting
to use the base stations instead of centralized cloud servers
for offloading computation tasks from mobile users, in order
to provide “IT and cloud-computing capabilities within the
radio access network (RAN) in close proximity to mobile
subscribers” [12]. Differing from traditional mobile cloud
computing systems, MEC systems with hierarchical con-
trolling and management are more near to the end users,
less coupled with the central cloud, less dependent on
the backhaul network, and therefore with a better sup-
port to latency-critical applications [4]. The exploitation of
MEC, however, can be constrained by the centralized 3GPP
LTE/EPS security architecture.
The current AKA procedure deeply relies on the MME in
central cloud, the backhaul latency in network attachment
and mobility management can become a bottleneck for the
quality of MEC services. When data congestions occur in
the core network, this delay will significantly increase, and
may violate the service latency requirement, especially for
some ultra-reliable and ultra-low-latency emergency com-
munication applications [13].
Additionally, the emerging concept of “5G Islands” [14],
[15] might be expected to autonomously provide local
devices with central-cloud-independent MEC services. On
one hand, 5G Islands can be created in a scheduled manner
to serve public events with dense requirement of local
MEC traffic, or to maintain MEC services with planned
disconnection from the core network. On the other hand,
they can be also created upon unexpected demand, so as
to provide temporary local MEC services for an improved
network resilience against cyber-attacks and extreme dis-
asters (such like fires, explosions, earthquakes etc.) that
can cause infrastructural malfunctions . This concept is
novel, but the development of its elements has already been
launched. For example, [16] discusses how 5G networks will
be able to support highly autonomous and smart decision
making capabilities at various layers of the network. Net-
work architectures [17], [18] were proposed where MMEs
autonomously perform UE management in a distributed
manner. In this field, distributed and decentralized edge
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security methods shall be developed to cope with non-static
and unreliable backhaul connections. More specifically, the
AKA procedures are expected to be decentralized at the
network edge, and to provide stable quality of service of
MEC in the 5G.
Aiming at a decentralized security approach for reliable
MEC, there are two key challenges to overcome:
• In the architectural perspective, a novel network ar-
chitecture is needed to enable a flexible and secure
migration of AAA functions between the central cloud
and edge clouds in virtualized 5G networks.
• In the operations perspective, it is critical to keep the
extra operations cost generated by the decentralization
and migration of AAA functions on a reasonable level.
III. DECENTRALIZED SECURITY APPROACH
OVER EDGE CLOUDS
A. 5G AUTHENTICATION AUTHORIZATION
ACCOUNTING
Towards a flexible decentralized AKA mechanism for re-
liable 5G MEC services, we proposed a novel virtualized
AAA approach: the 5G AAA [19]. It combines two inde-
pendent international standard systems that are the 3GPP
and the ETSI, as a single platform to manage and secure
the subscribers, the tenants and the network slices under the
5G flexible network environment.
Generally, 5G AAA system is constructed by a
Virtualized-AAA (V-AAA) manager in core network and
several V-AAA servers distributed in various ECs, and
supported by hierarchical databases approaches for tenant
data and tenant’s subscribers synchronization. This hierar-
chical database approach has been divided into two levels
of synchronization. Within the tenant network or dedicated
resources of tenant network slice would have bi-directional
replication across different regions. On the other hand, the
tenant’s subscriber database would be applied many-to-one
synchronization with the MNO core network subscriber
database. This a directional synchronization. This logical
illustration cab be found in Fig. 2. From the 3GPP view
on 5G network architecture [20], the 5G AAA system is
an advanced implementation of the access and mobility
management function (AMF), which provides a complete
generic AMF set in the central cloud with the V-AAA
Manager, while offering specifically customized subsets
of AMF for various 5G network slices in different local
ECs with the polymorphic V-AAA servers. Similarly, the
hierarchical databases and the Local Subscriber Servers
(LSS) together construct the 3GPP unified data management
(UDM). Taking the 4-layer-view on 5G network architecture
proposed by the 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership
(5G PPP) [21], the V-AAA Manager can be seen as part of
the business supporting system (BSS) on the service layer,
and each EC V-AAA server is a virtual network function
(VNF) dedicated to a particular network slice.
With such an architecture that distributes security func-
tions and databases to all ECs, the 5G AAA approach
enables a flexible and decentralized decision and application
of security policies in every EC. It is able to:
• Keep the centralized governance of tenants and mobile
subscribers in the central cloud;
• Allow a degree of freedom of tenant governance their
subscribers at the edge cloud;
• Use the AKA generated data to track and authenticate
the mobile subscribers from the edge cloud and central
cloud;
• Maintain the mobile subscribers and tenants with the
point of attachment in the central cloud as well as in
the edge cloud;
• Retain subscriber services even when the backhaul
connection is limited or unavailable;
• Provide a trust platform collecting the trust value
from the mobile subscribers to the NFV-based tenants,
and from the physical network entities to the virtual
network entities.
B. TRUST ZONE
The proposed 5G AAA [19] approach enables the AKA
procedure in the local EC to improve the MEC services.
Nevertheless, its deployment still calls for novel solutions
of adaptive AMF invocation. Due to the incomplete AMF
set and probably limited budget on security measures, the
local V-AAA servers are usually less secure than the central
V-AAA Managers. Therefore, it is generally preferred to
invoke the AMF from the central cloud in common cases,
and only to rely on the local version when the backhaul
connection cannot satisfy the latency requirement of MEC
services due to – intentional or unintentional – restrictions,
congestions and collapses. To achieve this, the 5G AAA
system must be able to adaptively switch between the
centralized and local security modes with respect to the
current backhaul connection status. The switching process
must be carefully designed to mitigate data leaks.
Motivated by this challenge, we designed an EC security
architecture, the Trust Zone (TZ), in order to enhance and
extend the 5G AAA approach to a cognitive solution [22].
The basic principle of TZ is to let the local EC cognitively
measure the quality of its backhaul connection. When the
backhaul is healthy, the AMF is invoked at the V-AAA
Manager in central cloud. When the backhaul connection is
seriously limited or unavailable, the TZ relies on the V-AAA
server that executes local AMF to maintain MEC services.
In a structural view, as illustrated in Fig. 2, a TZ system
consists of five entities:
1) Central Cloud Connection Monitoring (CCCM) –
This entity periodically visits the NFV orchestrator in
central cloud to evaluate the backhaul status. Addi-
tionally, when the backhaul connection is limited or
unavailable, CCCM tries to diagnose the malfunction.
This diagnosis, including information such the likely
location and reason of malfunction, can be used by
the software-defined network (SDN) management to
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FIGURE 2. The 5G AAA framework enhanced with Trust Zone in the 5G PPP architecture. The terms OSS, VIM, SDM-X, SDMO and SDM-C stand for
operations support system, virtual infrastructure manager, software-defined mobile network (SDM) controller, SDM orchestrator and SDM coordinator,
respectively. V/PNF denote virtual/physical network functions.
assist backhaul recovery with backup resources, e.g.
network redundancy and alternative routes such as
satellite links. A dynamic network resource allocation
in the SDN management can also be supported by
the backhaul status information. When the backhaul
connection becomes poor, specific network functions
such as mobility management and fault management
can obtain network resources with higher priorities.
2) Zone Management (ZM) – This is the core entity of
TZ, which implements most of AMFs and is connected
with all other TZ entities. It triggers and coordinates the
state transitions in TZ, when it receives reports about
updated backhaul status. Integrated with interfaces to
the central cloud and to the UEs, it also collaborates
with the Local Access Assistant (LAA) to accomplish
the AS security procedures in the local EC. When the
backhaul connection is healthy, ZM cooperates with the
V-AAA Manager in central cloud to execute centralized
AKA. When the backhaul is limited or unavailable,
local authentication is needed, ZM will then collaborate
with the LAA to execute local AKA instead.
3) Local Access Assistant (LAA) – This entity makes
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use of the subscriber information that is essential for
authentication and stored in the LSS, in order to locally
execute security measures such as AKA procedures. It
can be considered as a lite AMF module migrated from
the central cloud to the local EC. LAA is deactivated
by the ZM when the backhaul is reliably healthy, and
activated otherwise. The LAA is isolated from the
ZM mainly due to security concerns: the subscriber
database should be decoupled from the ZM that is
the central controlling unit of TZ and the priori target
of potential cyber-attacks. To mitigate the risk that
the LAA is attacked and manipulated to send fake
information to the central cloud, an asymmetric trust
relation between the central V-AAA manager and the
local V-AAA server is needed, as will be introduced in
Sec. III-C.
4) Security Auditing (SA) – Mobile network operators
(MNOs) usually keep logs of security critical opera-
tions for each subscriber. These logs can be audited
to investigate all potential risks of illegal access and
cyber-attacks. Both the log database and the auditing
center are usually located in the central cloud, so when
the backhaul connection is unavailable, they cannot
keep tracking the AAA operations executed by local
V-AAA servers. To close this gap and provide a con-
tinuous audit, the SA module is designed. It is activated
under the local security mode to record all local AAA
operations. After the backhaul recovery, these records
can be either actively pushed to the central auditing
center, or passively pulled upon request.
5) Emergency Services (ES) – we have named some
extreme disasters that can lead to backhaul outages in
Sec. II-B, such as fires, explosions and earthquakes.
These events can be harmful not only to the network
infrastructure, but also to human safety. A set of
emergency services can be defined, which help users
avoid personal injury and property damage under such
disasters, even when their devices cannot be authenti-
cated by the network. These services are implemented
in the ES entity, including but not limited to public
disaster alarm, evacuation guidance, positioning ser-
vice, emergency call and short message service (SMS).
Additionally, the ES is connected to the Internet-of-
things gateway (IoT-GW) to collect context information
about public disasters from external sensor networks.
Such information can be visited by the network func-
tion virtualization management and orchestration (NFV
MANO) through the CCCM to assist the network
diagnose and backhaul recovery processes.
Among those entities listed above, the first three entities are
dedicated to a specific tenant or network slice, and within
the EC V-AAA server. However, CCCM and ES are defined
as common functions and non-V-AAA server functions exist
on both control plane and user plane1
C. ASYMMETRIC TRUST TO SAFELY TRANSFER
ACCESS MANAGEMENT
It should be noted that local V-AAA servers are less secure
than the central V-AAA Manager. Cyber-attackers may
initiate attacks to disconnect the central cloud and the EC,
and hack the local TZ that is easier to target than the central
cloud. Then they may eventually attempt to obtain access to
the central cloud during the backhaul recovery, when the TZ
hands the access management back over to the central cloud.
To mitigate this risk, we designed an asymmetric approach
of transferring the access management between the central
cloud and the EC, which can be briefly summarized as
follows: When a degradation of backhaul connection occurs
and the TZ switches to the local security mode, all devices
already authenticated by the central V-AAA Manager before
the mode switching will be considered as trusted by the
local V-AAA server, and retain a seamless access to the
local MEC services. In contrast, devices that newly arrive
after the switching must go through a local authentication
and authorization process to access the MEC services. Only
the users that are successfully authenticated and authorized
are considered as temporarily trusted to access the local
MEC services, while for the rest devices only the emergency
services will be available. When the backhaul connection
recovers, all temporarily trusted devices in the local EC have
to reconnect to the network in a preplanned order, so that
they are authenticated and authorized by the central V-AAA
Manager again.
IV. CONTEXT-AWARENESS IN TRUST ZONE
A. CONTEXT-AWARE SYNCHRONIZATION OF
SUBSCRIBER PROFILES
The proposed local V-AAA server – or more specifically, the
LAA – relies on the subscriber authentication information
stored in the LSS to accomplish the local AKA procedure
in the EC. However, due to security concerns, parts of
such information, such like the NAS key, cannot be locally
generated in ECs, but only available in the central cloud.
Thus, the subscriber authentication information must be
synchronized from the central cloud to the LSS before the
EC switches to the local security mode, and periodically
updated. Furthermore, taking the device mobility into ac-
count, users may enter an EC from outside while it is
suffering from a high backhaul latency – or in the worst
case, disconnected from the central cloud. Therefore, a LSS
should not only synchronize the authentication information
of devices in the local EC, but also that of the devices in
neighbor ECs nearby, which are able to arrive in the local
EC during the next synchronization interval.
Self-evidently, with respect to the mobility, various de-
vices can move over different distances within the same
1Further details about the interfaces between TZ entities and a behavior
model of TZ are available in [22].
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synchronization interval. Thanks to the modern technologies
of transportations and communications, people are nowa-
days able to travel over three hundred kilometers per hour,
while continuously exploiting the cellular network services.
Considering the limited area of a typical EC, e.g. between
5 × 5 km2 and 15 × 15 km2 [23], the authentication
information of every such high-mobility subscriber must
be synchronized to 400 to 4000 different LSSs per hour.
Accounting the large amount of user devices in the entire
mobile network, this synchronization process will generate
a considerably significant data traffic over the backhaul
network, and hence leads to extra operating cost and raises
the risk of data congestion. In other words, there is a
conflict between the interests of subscribers (MEC service
reliability) and of MNOs (operating cost). In this concern,
we designed an advanced synchronizing mechanism with
awareness of the context information of both UEs and ECs,
which can be explained as follows.
The local security mode is activated only when the
central security services fail to respond in time, the gain
of subscriber authentication information synchronization is
therefore not significant in the ECs with negligible proba-
bility of Central Security Service Outage (CSSO). Note that
we refer to the term CSSO as the cases where the security
network functions in central cloud fail to respond within
the desired latency, instead of a complete unavailability of
service. Generally, to estimate this outage probability for a
certain device in different ECs, the following factors should
be taken into account:
1) User arrival: depending on the device-to-edge-cloud
spatial distance and the user mobility, every EC has its
individual expectation about the user arrival probability
in the next synchronization interval. The ECs located
far from the device have less chance to serve the device
than those located nearby. For still and low mobility
users, the user arrival estimation can be simply ac-
complished though the handover prediction procedure
of legacy networks. However, high-mobility users such
like vehicles on highway and railway passengers can
travel over multiple ECs during one backhaul outage,
so that an additional position prediction in macro scale
can be necessary.
2) User stay time: upon arrival, depending on the user
mobility, the coverage area of the EC and the traffic
model in that area, every EC has its individual expec-
tation about the duration of user’s stay in it. Some “im-
portant” ECs covering larger or more traffic-congested
areas (e.g. the city center of Paris) are expected to
serve a user for longer time, when compared to those
“unimportant” ones (e.g. a small village aside a high-
speed railway). The risk of CSSO during the user’s stay
in these ECs, therefore, is also higher.
3) Backhaul reliability: depending on the current status
of backhaul connection, every EC has its individual
expectation about the chance that a CSSO occurs
during a certain period in the future. Generally, the
ECs with worse current backhaul connection quality
are more likely to suffer from CSSO.
Thus, from real-time information of devices (mobility
and position) and ECs (coverage area, traffic model and
backhaul throughput), we are able to extract high-level con-
text information such as user motion pattern and backhaul
outage probability, as illustrated in Fig. 3. These context
information can be used to estimate the CSSO risk in
different ECs for every certain device.
More specifically, given a certain EC C, let T denote the
synchronization interval, the duration of u suffering from
CSSO in C in the next period of T is
E{to,u,C} = po,C
∫ T
0
farr,u(t)
∫ T−t
0
fstay,u(τ)τdτdt (1)
where po,C is the predicted probability of CSSO in C over
the next period T , farr,u,C(t) denotes the probability density
that u arrives in the coverage of C after t, and fstay,u,C(τ)
is the probability density function of u’s stay time τ in the
coverage of C upon arrival. The decision of synchronizing
the subscriber authentication information of u to C can be
then made following:{
To synchronize E{to,u,C}/T ≥ µ;
Not to synchronize E{to,u,C}/T < µ,
(2)
where µ is a pre-defined threshold, so that less redundant
backhaul traffic is generated. By setting µ to different levels,
the MNO is able to balance its interests in operating cost
and MEC service reliability.
Moreover, inspired by [14], if the MNO is able to evaluate
the loss of u in suffering from CSSO per unit time, call it lu,
and the operations cost cs,C to synchronize the subscriber
authentication information of a UE to C, there is a cost-
optimal strategy that minimizes the sum of potential CSSO
loss and operations cost:{
To synchronize E{to,u,C} · l ≥ cs,C ;
Not to synchronize E{to,u,C} · l < cs,C .
(3)
Therefore, we can individually solve the optimal threshold
for every C:
µopt,C =
cs,C
lT
. (4)
B. MODELING THE BACKHAUL CONNECTION STATUS
Although mature models and techniques are available to
estimate user mobility in mobile networks [24], which can
be applied in the CSSO estimation procedure discussed
above, a simple and efficient model for the backhaul status
is still called for.
Generally, a backhaul connection between the central
cloud and the edge cloud can be evaluated with its average
delay and packet error rate, which are easy to measure. With
these metrics, we are able to estimate the probability that the
central security server responses in time to support a certain
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FIGURE 3. Trust Zone extracts the context information of UEs & EC to
estimate the central security service outage probability.
edge computing service, when given its specific latency
requirement. We define this probability as the Central Se-
curity Service Reliability (CSSR), which exhibits stochastic
behavior in long term and can be modeled as a Markov
chain according to [25], as shown in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Central security service reliability as a Markov chain, circled
numbers are state indexes.
In our model, the backhaul network at any time instant
is considered to be in one among several predefined states.
Every state describes a specific combination of CSSR range
and network state. According to the CSSR level, we defined
three basic network states: healthy, unhealthy and discon-
nected. Additionally, the network operator may recognize
network disasters and take necessary measures to repair the
backhaul connection, for which we set an extra state under
recovery.
Usually, the CSSR does not vary fiercely but smoothly,
so only fluctuations between neighbor CSSR levels are
considered, as we illustrate with solid arrows in Fig. 4.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Sec. II-B, some disasters
and cyber-attacks, although rarely happen, can cause sudden
disconnection of backhaul. In this case, the backhaul con-
nection will fail to autonomously recover by itself, unless
manual repair is taken. Therefore, in the model we enabled
unidirectional transitions from the healthy and unhealthy
states to the disconnected state, which are illustrated with
dotted arrows in Fig. 4. Furthermore, the network operator
will take autonomous or manual measures to recover the
backhaul network only when it is not healthy, and the
recovery process will continuously improve the CSSR until
it becomes healthy again, as denoted with the dashed arrows
in Fig. 4. By training the model with historical log data of
the network operator, we are able to estimate the transition
probabilities and predict the future CSSR. A demonstrative
example output of our Markov chain is depicted in Fig. 5,
which is generated from an artificial state transition proba-
bility matrix T of
0.8 0.1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001
0.5 0.49 0.0099 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001
0 0.25 0.5 0.15 0 0.0999 0 0 0.0001
0 0 0.25 0.5 0.15 0 0.0999 0 0.0001
0 0 0 0.2 0.6 0 0 0.1 0.1
0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7

.
Here, Ti,j denotes the probability of transition from the state
i to j, for all {i, j} ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9}2.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time / min
< 5%
5% - 60%
60% - 80%
80% - 99.9%
99.9 - 99.999%
> 99.999%
CS
SR
Disconnected
Unhealthy
Recovery
Healthy
Ba
ck
ha
ul
 s
ta
tu
s
FIGURE 5. An example simulation of CSSR generated by our Markov chain
(the blue curve), and the corresponding network state (the red circles).
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
We conduct numerical simulation to validate the effective-
ness of the TZ approach, as to describe below.
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A. ENVIRONMENT SETUP
An 8 × 8 km2 region with UE density of 6250/km2 is
considered. An EC covers a circular urban area with radius
of 2 km that locates in the center of the region, which is
surrounded by four suburban and rural areas, as illustrated
in Fig. 6.
FIGURE 6. Geographical map of the simulated region, EC is the coverage of
the local EC, while I – IV are neighbor suburban and rural areas.
The simulation initializes with number of UEs that are
uniformly distributed across the region. Also, every UE is
assigned to a mobility class that is randomly selected from
HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW and STILL with equal probabili-
ties. To generate the mobility of individual users, a variety
of models have been proposed that can be classified into
four categories, namely the random walk model, the random
waypoint model, the fluid flow model and Gauss-Markov
model, respectively [24]. Considering the dependency of
user mobility on the terrain and traffic environment, here
we have extended the random walk model with 600 s steps,
where a Gaussian distributed “basic speed” is generated for
every moving UE according to its mobility class. This basic
speed is then linearly scaled according to both the mobility
class and the area where the UE is located, and combined
with an uniformly distributed random direction, in order to
obtain the UE’s movement. Details are listed in Tabs. 2 and
3. Once a UE leaves the region, a new arriving UE will be
created to keep a constant overall UE density. We let the
UEs move for 40 h so that the UE densities in all five areas
converge to consistent levels.
TABLE 2. Basic speed of different UE mobility classes (in m/s)
Mobility Class STILL LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Basic Speed 0 ∼ N (1.5, 0.5) ∼ N (10, 2) ∼ N (40, 5)
TABLE 3. Speed scaling factors for different mobility classes and areas, still
UEs omitted as they do not move
Mobility Class
Area EC I II III IV
LOW 1 1 1 1 1
MEDIUM 0.7 1 0.9 0.8 0.9
HIGH 0.2 1 0.9 0.85 0.8
Meanwhile, we take the Markov chain described in Sec.
IV-B to generate the CSSR of unstable central security
services in the EC as a random process, which is updated by
every simulation step. In every simulation step, depending
on the current CSSR, there is a specific chance that a CSSO
occurs in the EC.
B. TESTING THE TRUST ZONE
We consider a TZ implemented in the EC serving an urban
area. It is assumed to have complete knowledge about the
Markov chain parameters of the EC’s CSSR. After the
convergence of UE densities in different areas, the TZ
tracks the positions of UEs for 24 h to learn about the
statistical motion patterns, in order to predict the arrival
probability and stay time of every UE in the EC. After
the training phase, the TZ is activated to estimate the
CSSO risk criterion E{to,u,C}/T in the next T = 30 min
for every UE u in the region. If and only if the risk
exceeds a pre-defined threshold, the UE’s subscriber profile
will be synchronized from the central cloud to enable TZ
operation upon CSSO, and a backhaul traffic will be thereby
generated. This operation repeats every 30 min. By every
simulation step, if a CSSO occurs in the EC, every UE that
has not had its subscriber profile synchronized will suffer
from the CSSO once, and therewith generate a CSSO report.
To demonstrate the potential of cost optimization indicated
by (4), we assume a normalized loss rate l = 1/hour and
cs,C = 5×10−5 so that µopt,C = 1×10−4. This testing phase
continues one month, and the performance of TZ under
different specifications of decision threshold are illustrated
in Fig. 7.
It can be observed that the deployment of TZ can effec-
tively reduce the loss of user experience caused by CSSOs.
Especially, by configuring the decision threshold to different
levels, we can achieve a flexible balance between the service
reliability and the operations cost. Especially, the sum of
CSSO-caused loss and operations cost is minimized at the
analytical optimum of decision threshold.
                   1  $
 & U L W L F D O  & 6 6 2  U L V N  O H Y H O  W R  V \ Q F K U R Q L ] H  V X E V F U L E H U  S U R I L O H
 
     
     
     
     
      
      
       Synchronized subscriber profiles per hour
CSSO reports per month
FIGURE 7. The performance of TZ under different specifications of decision
threshold. Note that N/A stands for no TZ deployment, which is the baseline of
LTE systems.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER CHALLENGES
In this paper, we have indicated the future 5G telecommu-
nication networks with dense application of MEC services,
and the current LTE/EPS security architecture in 3GPP
Release 14 drawbacks with its centralized AKA mechanism.
We proposed a solution integrated with our 5G AAA ap-
proach which enables the execution of AKA functionality at
the ECs, in order to support better deployment of 5G MEC
services. An innovative EC security architecture, the Trust
Zone, has been introduced to enhance the 5G AAA with a
cognitive access management with respect to the backhaul
connection quality. Furthermore, we designed a context-
aware mechanism of synchronizing subscriber authentica-
tion information to local subscriber databases, which helps
in reducing the backhaul network traffic generated by the
Trust Zone. Numerical simulation showed that our proposed
method can effectively improve the reliability of EC services
in the context of unstable security network functions in
central cloud, while being capable to keep a flexible balance
between the MEC reliability and the operations cost.
We will continue to investigate better methods to improve
the authentication process in 5G. It shall be noted that
some assumptions and simplifications, such as the uniform
distribution of UE and the extended random walk model, can
be inaccurate in practical use cases. Advanced models such
as the work reported in [26] will be applied to simulate more
realistic user mobility. In terms of increasing the service
reliability, we will apply machine learning and deep learning
techniques to build precise models from field measurements
of CSSR, in order to improve the accuracy and efficiency
of centralized security. Furthermore, the proposed decen-
tralized security mechanisms need to be evaluated with
respect to their applicability of local authentication and
authorization in hybrid private-public mobile networks as
expected for 5G, e.g. 5G enterprise networks inter-working
with 5G public land mobile networks.
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